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I. INTRODUCTION
On 31 July 2001, a distinguished Canadian jurist reported on
matters of unusual significance. Sitting as a Member of the Commission for
Public Complaints Against the RCMP' (CPC), Mr. Justice E.N. Hughes dealt
with matters that go to the heart of liberal democracy.
Any investigation of alleged police misconduct is important, of
course, to a country that wishes to be governed in accordance with
fundamental principles of the rule of law. This is so even in the seemingly
most inconsequential instances. Important principles are involved even
where "small" matters are concerned. The matters before Commissioner
O 2001, W.W. Pue.
Professor of Law and Nemetz Chair in Legal History. University of British Columbta.
Thisis now the correct name for the bodywhich. at the time of Mr. Jusitee Hughes appointment,
was known as the RcPc Public Complaints Commission. The body vas renamed effecti-c I January
2001 in order to emphasize that "the Commission is an mderandent agency and is not part of the
RCMr." (Reclaiming Our Vision, Annual Report, Commission for Public Complaints Aganst the mcz-p,
Minister of Public Works and Government Services, June .10l, at 14).
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Hughes on this occasion however raise a number of large issues that only
rarely come before formal inquiries.
The matter known in Canada as "the APEC affair," and
Commissioner Hughes' APEC report ("Hughes Report") focus on
allegations of wrongdoing by the police and the Prime Minister of Canada
at the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) Conference held in
Vancouver in November 1997.2 The particular allegations, which have
dominated the House of Commons and Canadian political life on several
occasions, will be addressed in a moment.
First, however, it is worth pausing briefly to consider some
fundamental principles concerning police and politicians.
II. POLICE MATTER
Canadians tend to be strongly supportive of their police. Police
officers have an obviously difficult job that involves them in many difficult,
unpleasant, and even dangerous duties. They are the individuals to whom
we look first when property losses or accidents occur or when danger
threatens. Their role in law enforcement and in preserving "peace, order,
and good government" is widely appreciated. The police officer as "helper"
is an image that most of us accept. Most Canadians teach their children to
turn to police officers for help when they need it.
Images of "police as helpers" have remarkable strength. They are
so strong, in fact, that they often obscure another equally important aspect
of policing. Police may be helpers, but they also constitute a highly
organized, armed force. As such, they are dangerous. Most of their
important operational decisions are made in secret, invisibly, beyond public
scrutiny. They exercise immense discretion in deciding when, how, and
against whom to apply the law (think of the last time you were caught
speeding). Their power is naked. It includes surveillance, use of force,
handcuffing, arrest, and confinement. Only rarely, however, is police power
subjected to critical scrutiny.
2 The APEC affair is discussed in W.W. Pue, ed., Pepper in Our Eyes: TheAPECAffair (Vancouver:
University of British Columbia Press, 2000) [hereinafter Pepper]. The full name for the Hughes Report
is Commission for Public Complaints Against the RCMtP, RCMP Act - Part VII Subsection 45.,15(14),
Commission Interim Report Following a Public Hearing Into the Complaints regarding the events that took
place in connection with demonstrations during the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference in
Vancouver, B.C., in November 1997at the UBC Campus and Richmond detachments of the RCMP (Ottawa:
CPC RCMP, 31 July 2001).
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Another image is helpful here, if only to import some balance into
our thinking. Imagining police officers as "bureaucrats with guns" might
conjure up rather different public perceptions. Such an image opens a
partially accurate alternative insight. Hidden power is dangerous and people
who carry guns to work are certainly powerful. The point is not that
individual cops (or bureaucrats) are "bad" but only that there is an
important aspect of their job that we need to think about. The difference
between "bureaucrats with guns" and la, enforcement officers is simple:
police are supposed to be prohibited equally from pursuit of their own
desires and from acting on the whim of politicians. Unlike civil servants,
they are not supposed to respond to "political masters." Their job, simply,
is to enforce the law.
The difference between these two alternative ,iews-each captures
important aspects of a larger truth-is crucially important. Significant
deviation in the direction of either the pursuit of police officers' interests
or taking orders from politicians is a prescription for lawlessness, a
harbinger of a "police state." Consider, for example, the treatment meted
out by President Mugabe's police in Zimbabwe:
Simon Rhodes, a tourism consultant %,ho has Incd in Zimbab',e since 1977, ts the -on of
Margaret Rhodes, 74, first cousin of the queen,
Mr. Rhodes vas walking to his carvwhen two policemen grabbed him from behind. He saxd
he was thron into the back of a Land Ro cr "m an extremelywlolent manner" and asmulted
by four policemen.
"One constable twisted both my armsbehind my backand a sergeant repratedlypunched me
in the throat. Another one hit me on the side of the head."
Before being freed, Mr. Rhodes asked the in.ector whether the role of the paltce %,as to
protect all Zimbabwean citizens. -He told me,'No, Mr. Rhodes. ve are here to protect the
interests of the government.' That xw a , reealing comment',
This example points to the importance of police and politicians
alike internalizing a view of the policing role that is compatible with liberal
democracy. It is entirely unacceptable for either to come to see the job of
police as being to "protect the interests of the government". The police, in
the common law tradition, are to be "citizen police," respectful of the
3 David Blair, "Observers see Zimbabe clashes as forerunner to civl war Fight for democracy"
The Daily Telegraph, with files from Agence France-Presse [pnnted in XattenaIPovi 3 April ZVD1,
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public of which they are part, obedient only to the law, and not agents of
partisan politics.'
III. THE HUGHES INQUIRY: THE PARTICULAR ALLEGATIONS
Because of the importance of these matters, the incidents falling
within Commissioner Hughes' purview register significantly in Canadian
constitutionalism. Reduced to a nutshell, the allegations he was called upon
to investigate fell into three categories:
(1) allegations of improper or even criminal actions by individual
police officers (wrongful arrests, unnecessary roughness,
gratuitous use of pepper spray, police dogs, improper strip-
searches, use of pepper spray as punishment, and so on);
(2) allegations that the police wrongfully attempted to buffer
visiting dignitaries from the sight or sound of peaceful
demonstrations, in so doing, violating fundamental rights of
Canadians including freedom of speech, freedom of association
or assembly, freedom of movement, and so on.
(3) allegations that the police did all or some of these things in
direct response to wrongful orders from the Prime Minister's
Office. (It was alleged in the hearings and in the media, the
House of Commons, and elsewhere, that these orders
originated from Prime Minister Chr6tien himself.
Commissioner Hughes, however, had no jurisdiction to
investigate the Prime Minister's conduct as such. Consequently,
this intriguing, supremely important, question was never
"before" the Commission5 and has not been dealt with in any
forum.)
Commissioner Hughes' inquiry had limited jurisdiction, limited
resources, and limited fact-finding ability. Nonetheless, he conclusively
found each of these central allegations proved. The report documents
several cases of improper conduct by individual officers. Hughes also found
4 For a discussion of "citizen police" see Don Sorochan, "The APEC Protest, the Rule of Law, and
Civilian Oversight of Canada's National Police Force" in Pepper supra note 2,57 at 62. Allied concepts
and issues are explored in P.C. Stenning, "Someone to Watch over Me: Government Supervision of the
RCMP" in Pepper, ibid at 87.
5 This jurisdictional issue is discussed in W. Wesley Pue, "Executive Accountability and the APEC
Inquiry: Comment on 'Ruling on Applications to Call Additional Government Witnesses' (2000) 34
U.B.C.L. Rev. 335 [hereinafter "Executive Accountability".
[VOL. 39, NO. I
Prime Minister's Police? The APEC Report
that police officers did on occasion improperly seek to inhibit the exercise
of constitutional rights by Canadians in order to protect the sensibilities,
not the personal security, of visiting dignitaries.
Most stunning, though, is the finding that the Prime Minister's
Office had engaged in two instances of "improper involvement in the RC -1P
security operation" and that the police had "succumbed to government
influence and intrusion in an area where such influence and intrusion were
inappropriate. 6 This is the first such authoritative finding of wrongful
interference with the police on the part of any Canadian prime minister or
his or her office.:
A few comments are in order with respect to each of the principal
matters. All of this needs to be understood against the background of the
evidentiary and jurisdictional limitations within which Commissioner
Hughes operated.
A. "On the evidence before me"
It would be entirely inappropriate for any judicial officer to draw
conclusions not fully supported by the evidence. Commissioner Hughes was
especially careful not to draw inferences that were not conclusively justified
on the basis of evidence before him. Fact-findings throughout are
cautiously drawn. Commissioner Hughes' report is liberally sprinkled with
findings of fact qualified by the phrase "on the evidence before me," or its
equivalent, such words serving as constant reminder of the limitations of
the particular inquiry process.
In this case the Commission's ability to probe the facts was inhibited
in four ways. First, much important evidence was solely in the hands of a
federal government determined to shield potentially damaging evidence
from scrutiny. Claims of "privilege" or allied doctrines were frequently
made during the hearings and the Commission proved powerless to compel
the production of documents or other evidence when "privilege" was
invoked. Given that the substance of the APEC allegations focused on the
conduct of the prime minister and his senior staff, this was akin to giving
the fox the key to the henhouse.
6 Hughes Report, supra note 2 at 43S.
7 There are other instances in which other observcrs hae suspected some such thing and, a few
times, allegations of this sort have been raised seriously and vwith some credible evidence in suptort.
(See Stenning, supra note 4 for examples). Nonetheless, the Hughes Report. b:, is the first time any
authoritative tribunal has found political interference with the police to hate in fact occurred.
20011
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Second, Commissioner Hughes acted without advice of
independent counsel. The lawyers who appear as "Commission Counsel"
in CPC hearings are, in fact, employees of the CPC. They work for the Chair
of the Commission and she in turn is appointed by Order-in-Council. The
more direct terminology for such an appointment is that this is a "political
appointment" made by the Privy Council Office on behalf of the prime
minister.8 There are two problems with this arrangement. First, as the
British Columbia Civil Liberties Association's brief pointed out, there is at
least an apparent conflict of interest where "the Prime Minister, to whom
the Chair ultimately owes her job, has a direct and personal interest in the
outcome of the proceedings." 9 Equally important are the practical
implications for the Commissioner hearing the matter. "Commission
counsel" are, in fact, lawyers working for an Ottawa bureaucracy, not, as
one might properly expect, independent counsel answerable only to the
tribunal Chair. The only truly independent member of the inquiry staff was
the Commissioner, who confronted a daunting task in this complex, multi-
layered case that involved 170 days of hearings, 153 witnesses, 710 exhibits,
and over forty thousand pages of testimony.
Third, if Commissioner Hughes suffered from limited resources, he
also suffered from a limited power to obtain evidence. This made it
practically impossible to seek out any information that was not voluntarily
disclosed. In this case almost all germane evidence lay in the hands of the
Government of Canada or the RCMP, 1 0 producing a fundamental, pervasive
skewing of information. There was no evidentiary "level playing field."
Every lawyer knows that a good part of the litigation "game" lies in filtering
the evidence that will appear before the fact-finder. We can assume that
Ottawa's lawyers were astute enough to prevent the introduction of
evidence damaging to their clients. Moreover, the Crown (i.e. the prime
minister and executive branch) enjoys special privileges to exclude
8 This is a reasonably accurate description of the functioning of government in Canada though not,
perhaps, the way the thing works in theory. See D.J. Savoie, Governing from the Centre: The
Concentration of Power in Canadian Politics (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999). Whether the
Chair of the CPC RCMP is in fact susceptible to political pressures is, of course, another matter. See,
however, the disturbing account provided by the first "APEC" panel chair: "Gerald M. Morin, Q.C.,
'Personal Reflections on the Ill-Fated First APEC Inquiry' in Pepper, supra note 2.
9 Hughes Report, supra note 2 at 441.
10 Curiously, the two were never distinguished in the hearings, the RCMP as an institution being
represented by Ivan Whitehall, Q.C., general counsel for the Government of Canada. Thcre is an irony
in this in the context of an inquiry which, in pith and substance, concerned allegations that the RcMiP
lacked sufficient independence.
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evidence. In most cases these work effectively as an absolute bar to
information, a trump card.
The Hughes Commission was powerless in situations where
evidence went missing. Whereas the Somalia Inquiry, for example, had
been able to pursue missing documents quite aggressively, the arc is
incapable of following even apparently important evidentiary leads. Not all
inquiries are created equal. Thus, for example, the Commission was unable
to pursue the matter when Jean Carle, then the Prime Minister's Director
of Operations announced that he had shredded relevant documents. z
Similarly, a RCMI source told the National Post newspaper that tapes of
police radio transmissions "punctuated with 'Jean Carle wants this' and
'Jean Carle wants that"' had gone missing.t3 The Hughes Commission,
lacking genuine investigative powers or resources, was entirely dependent
on the very people whose conduct was called into question for the
production of evidence. Official Ottawa is notorious for its hostility to
freedom of information. 4 Even assuming the utmost integrity, good faith,
and public spiritedness on the part of everyone involved, the Commission's
dependence on federal employees to allocate their time, their resources,
and their energy to the mission of finding and disclosing evidence that
might damage them or their "bosses" is remarkable.
Finally, it needs to be noted that the parties appearing before
Commissioner Hughes were anything but equal. The adversary system is
premised on the notion that two opponents, each seekingvctory, will each
muster the best evidence available. When two opposed parties present their
best evidence to the adjudicator, so the theory goes, all relevant evidence
will come out, allowing an impartial adjudicator to find the truth. In this
case, however, the litigation teams were anything but equal. For all
practical purposes the combined RCMP-Government of Canada team
enjoyed unlimited access to lawyers, background research and preparation,
li See P. Desbarats, Somalia Corer-up:A Conuniss oncr's cJuraal (Toronto MleCiciland & Stewart,
1997).
12 This matter was pursued without effect by lavers for complamants dunng the APEC heann,. o
The destruction of documents was recorded on Parliamentary record by Ale.a MeDonough, leader of
the New Democratic Party on 24 September 1998: "Todavv, e learned that former op rattonsdirector.
Jean Carle, has admitted to destroying documents pertaining to Spray-PEC" online, Hansard
<http:.AIi.w'.parl.g.a!361parlbus hambusfbusedbatcei125-S993-69-247han125_425-e htm>
(date accessed: 14 September 2001).
13 National Post, 23 August 1999.
14 See Office of the Information Commissioner of Canada, .4nnnal Rqpr 2'.2&)1
<http:IAv,-w, .infocom.gc.ca!reports2000-20O0t-c.asp> (date accessed: 14 Seplembcr 2'O1)
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and resources. The complainants, on the other hand, were represented by
a few lawyers whose backup resources were distinctly limited. Member of
Parliament Jim Abbott aptly observed that this was equivalent to "a
rowboat up against a battleship." 5
B. Individual Police Officers
The 1997 APEC conference was a significant event. It provoked one
of the largest peaceful demonstrations in decades. A number of things went
wrong, large numbers of demonstrators were arrested, and many
complaints were lodged about the conduct of individual police officers. Two
features about Commissioner Hughes' approach to these matters are
notable.
Commissioner Hughes took great pains, wherever he could, to
avoid impugning individual RCMP officers.1 6 In several instances this
produced findings that most lay readers would likely think overly forgiving
of the police officers concerned. Hughes seems to have applied something
like a criminal law burden of proof (beyond reasonable doubt) before
finding against individual officers. Moreover, the evidence of protesters or
complainants was not always treated as generously at that of police officers,
leading to trenchant criticism of the report-one critic dismissed it, unfairly
in my opinion, as one of the most expensive "doorstops" ever. 7
A second point about the Commission and its report is important
but has .been much missed in subsequent public commentary. It is
something that should be-but probably is not-obvious to all lawyers.
Simply put, this was a legal proceeding, limited in its jurisdiction, bound by
rules of evidence, and directed to improving the operation of the RCMP.
The c is not in the business of finding fault, criminal responsibility, or
liability as such. Commissioner Hughes was quite clear on this point,
emphasizing:
Cited in Pepper, supra note 2 at XX.
16 This is especially important in the context in which a former Solicitor General had said he was
providing "cover" for the Prime Minister and that part of the outcome would be that several individual
Mounties would have to take a fall. See Affidavit of Dick Proctor, M.P., 4 November 1998 (filed with
the RCMP Public Complaints Commission), online: <http://www.tv.cbc.ca/national/pgminfo/apcc/
doc38a.html> (date accessed: 10 September 2001).
17 1. Bailey & M. Higgins, "Report a big 'doorstop,' demonstrators say-Implementation doubted"
National Post, with files from The Canadian Press <http://www.nationalpost.com/search/
story.htmlf=/stories/20010807/638291.html&qs=jaggi%20singh> (date accessed: 10September2001).
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My jurisdiction is limited by the R cM Pct to making'findings' and Irccommcndatons-' This
Commission has no power to determine either ci d orcnminal liabilityon the part of anyone.
I emphasize that the findings and recommendations made in this report cannot he taken
as legal findings of criminal or civil liability.i
This cuts both ways. There may be incidents of police conduct
judged to be "inappropriate" by Commissioner Hughes to which no
criminal responsibility or civil liability attaches. Conversely, there were
probably incidents in which the evidence adduced simply did not permit a
clear "finding" of wrongdoing, even in instances where many informed
observers-members of parliament, media commentators, complainants,
and informed members of the public, for example-might "smell a rat."
Judicial fact-finders simply are not empowered to "read" too much
"between the lines." Law shuns a false positive. Not seeing a "rat" clearly
in the evidence, a judicial fact-finder should not "find" as proved that a
"rat" was present. But this does not prove the opposite either-that there
in fact were no vermin lurking in the shadows.
Just as Hughes' critical assessments do not necessarily foreground
criminal or civil fault, his exculpatory assessments do not preclude findings
in other fora. Thus, for example, findings that a particular officer acted
under great stress, or did otherwise blameworthy things for understandable
reasons (such as lack of guidance or experience, having been put in an
untenable situation as a result of political interference, improper command,
poor organization, or other failures of senior officers) implies nothing
about civil liability or even criminal wrongdoing. These are different issues.
No issue of civil fadt or criminal wrongdoing was before Commissioner
Hughes. Just as acting under stress clearly does not excuse criminal conduct
("I was angry vth my neigbour when I hit her"), so too unlawful superior
command or "keystone cops" style organizational incompetence provides
no shelter for police officers who do wrong.
C. Violations of Constitutionally Protected Rights
The report is clear that the RMIP'S organization of this major
security operation in fact ran something like a "keystone cops" operation.
Whatever else it showed, the APEC affair reflects poorly on the "brass" of
Is Hughes Report, stupra note 2 at 4.
19 Vancouier (Ckt) Po ice Departmcntv.British Cola in tw wehre mp! 7t Conznm:saro/,4 IJ
B.C.J. No. 1405 at para. 20, online: QL (BCJ), per Justice Southin.
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Canada's national police force. The organization was shown to be
incompetent in all respects, ranging from defining a security perimeter to
protecting it. Even straightforward, seemingly obvious, matters were not
attended to. These included the stunning failure to provide an unobstructed
exit route for ApEC diginitaries and officials (the United States Secret
Service must have been infuriated by this blooper), failure to arrange
adequate detention facilities for law breakers in proximity to well-
advertised demonstrations, failure to anticipate large numbers of peaceful
demonstrators seeking "symbolic" arrest, and incompetence in drafting
conditions for release. On the day of the summit, police officers with no
authority showed up and assumed command responsibility, busloads of
officers were carried away from where they were needed, crucial
information (e.g. "these law-abiding demonstrators are fully cooperative
with the police") was not communicated, and disinformation was acted on.
The RCMP command left its officers open to improper pressure from the
Prime Minister's Office and from the Chinese consulate.
But this policing debacle was not the least funny. The undeniable
result of this comedy of errors was that substantial numbers of Canadians
were roughed-up, interfered with, or arrested. The constitutional and
citizenship rights of a number of law-abiding-or, at worst, modestly civilly-
disobedient-citizens were infringed. These violations of individual rights
by the RCMP were not trivial. One protester, Mr. Wolinetz, was pepper-
sprayed directly"° by a RCMP staff sergeant who was found not to be using
"justifiable or appropriate" force in so doing.2 Wolinetz was then confined,
handcuffed, and locked in a police van for some considerable time without
adequate decontamination being provided. When assistance was sought the
police officer in charge of the van apparently said something to the effect
of "you got what you deserved."2 This is one "minor" incident of improper
behaviour by the police that also violated individual rights. Here is how it
was described by Mr. Wolinetz:
I was in extreme pain-I was soaked head to toe in the pepper spray; it was honestly one of
the worst experiences of my life. I have been hurt playing numerous sports, I've broken
bones. I've just recently had a major operation and none of it comes close to comparing to
the-to the way the spray felt. My eyes were firmly shut, I couldn't see, my nose was just
running and full of mucous and it just felt like my entire face and my ears were burning up;
like the best analogy I can come up with is, I'd somehow gotten my face stuck on a hot
20 Hughes Report, supra note 2 at 363.
21 Ibid. at 355.
22 Ibid. at 382.
Prime Minister's Police? The APEC Report
burner, an element, and I couldn't peel it off. And during that tzme, I as hy:ercntatin,
sobbing, screaming, kicking the door-basically just begging and pleading for somn dy to
help me, to make it stopY,
There is nothing insignificant about this case or about other police
violations of individual rights or police brutality.
Moreover, the reputation of the RCMP for competence,
professionalism, and efficiency is seriously damaged. Commissioner Hughes
found the Force had failed "to meet an acceptable and expected standard
of competence, professionalism and proficiency in carrying out their
duties."'24
But, serious though these incidents are, they were not the crucial
problem. Keystone cops incompetence is one thing, a police force that
allows itself to be improperly deployed for political purposes-and
politicians who see nothing wrong with so using the police-is quite
another. It is to these matters, the core of the APEc affair, that I now turn.
D. Political Interference
Whatever the consequences, the evil flowing from "dumb cops,"
"stressed" police officers, or keystone cops are, in principle, relatively easily
remedied: better recruiting, better organization, better training, better
staffing, better discipline, more effective civilian accountability, better
commanding officers, and so on.
The problem presented by a police force that cannot resist
improper political demands is not, however, so easily fixed. The ZAPEc
report revealed that the RCMp had allowed itself to be subjected to political
influence on at least two occasions. True to form, Commissioner Hughes
was very careful in coming to these conclusions. He refused to "connect the
dots" in any instance (there were many) in which there was considerable
but not entirely conclusive evidence of political meddling with the police.
One example of his extraordinary caution is shown in the way he
approached a pattern of interference with of residents of the University of
British Columbia's Green College, all of it resulting in the removal of their
protest signs by police. On 22 November 1997, several days before the APEC
leaders' summit, police officers seemed to have formed the impression that
their job was to restrict freedom of expression at the site. Here is how
23 Ibid. at 331.
24
Ibid at 102
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Commissioner Hughes dealt with the matter of a protester's sign being
removed against her will:
I accept Ms. Pearlston's evidence that an officer told her that the removal was due to orders
from the Prime Minister's Office that there should be 'no signs and no people' on that side
of the street. Both [Vancouver Police Department] and RCMP officers were present at the
time but the officer who spoke to Ms. Pearlston was never identified. This evidence cannot,
on its own, be relied upon as a basis for concluding that the Prime Minister had in fact
ordered signs down.y
Note the restrictions here. First, the evidence of an entirely
improper and unlawful exercise of police authority was credible, but
imperfect. Hughes accepted as fact that a police officer had said this to the
witness. However, the officer could not be positively identified, making it
unclear whether a RCMP officer or a Vancouver Police Department officer
had uttered these words. Only on the former assumption would the matter
have been within the cPc's jurisdiction. Secondly, the matter could not as
a practical matter be pursued in order to find out who had uttered these
words, or whether some such improper view of police officers' duties was
widely shared amongst the police. There was no way for this tribunal to find
out how many police officers thought of their duties in this way or how they
might have come to this conclusion. Thus, the fact that Ms. Pearlston's
signs were taken down and that she was threatened with arrest could only
be treated as a case of a single "bad apple" or "stressed cop" making a
dumb "mistake." Why the police officer invoked the Prime Minister's
name, Commissioner Hughes could not say. Similarly, Commissioner
Hughes refused to construe the subsequent removal of all protest signs
from the Green College site on the day of the leaders' meeting as
corroboration of the political interference the police officer who talked to
Karen Pearlston had spoken of.
Lacking both jurisdiction and the practical means of seeking out
further evidence, Commissioner Hughes found the explanation of this
puzzling police conduct in the actions of blundering-but-generally-well-
meaning police officers whose motivations were misunderstood by
demonstrators who were confused as to what the police had told them
about the removal of protest signs. Similarly, neither the removal of a
Tibetan flag from a point where it would have been visible to the leaders
nor the attempted enforcement of a "noise-free" zone compelled
Commissioner Hughes to discern an invisible political hand stirring the
2 5 1bidat 107.
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police. Even when construed against the background of the Prime
Minister's Office's insistence on creating a "retreat-like" atmosphere (an
understandable though not a lawful objective), Commissioner Hughes
would only go so far as to say that all this created the "appearance" of a
crackdown on free speech. This is cautious fact-finding indeed. Some might
consider it cautious to a fault.
Others, less careful about jurisdiction and evidentiary constraints
would perhaps be more inclined to connect the dots, drawing the inferences
these circumstances and others like them seem so clearly to point to.
However, the judicial duty imposes constraints and only Commissioner
Hughes heard all the evidence. It was not properly his purpose to draw
inferences of political interference where the evidence (such as it was)
allowed for alternative explanation. There would, simply, be no finding of
political interference by Commissioner Hughes in any case in which a
"keystone cops" explanation would suffice: Occam's razor was rigorously
applied.
Noting the extraordinary caution in all matters of fact-finding,
Hughes' conclusion that there were two clear instances of improper
political interference with the police is stunning. His judiciousness in all
respects renders his findings in this regard unassailable. Both instances
involved interference by the prime minister's Director of Operations, Jean
Carle, who was omnipresent in the days leading up to the APEC conference
and on the day of the conference itself.' An extremely close personal friend
of the Prime Minister, he held a pivotal position:
Jean Carle, then Director of Operations in the Prime Minister's Office ... acted as hatzon
between the Prime Minister's Office, Acco [Aac Canada Co-ordinating Officej, the
Department of Foreign Affairs, the Rcrtlp and foreign bodie. Mr. Carle reported to Jean
Pelletier, Chief of Staff in the Prime Minister's Office vho, in turn, reported to the Prime
Minister. Mr. Carle had access to the Prime Minister to discuss AFEC matters as the need
arose.-'
In one instance Jean Carle's interventions caused protesters who
had set up tents and created a protest camp at a site near the planned
leaders' conference to be arrested. This was done even though "there was
no security reason" for the move and despite the fact that they "were
26 He was, for example, present at a meeting v'ith a staff sergeant moments bzfore a group of
peaceful protesters were pepper sprayed even as most of them ,ere attempting to respond to phce
instructions. Commissioner Hughes draws no inference from this.
27
"Hughes Report," supra note 2 at 55.
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peacefully protesting, " ' exercising citizenship "rights under section 2(b) of
the Charter."'29 In this case Commissioner Hughes found:
... the RCMP'S conduct in removing the tenters was directly attributable to the actions of the
federal government. It was Mr. Carle of the Prime Minister's Office who, through Mr.
Vanderloo of ACCO directed the RCMP to remove the protesters ...
The federal government had no authority to make decisions which may have compromised
an RCMP security operation, particularly given that such decisions.., were unjustifiably
inconsistent with the Charter. I am satisfied that, in this instance, the federal government,
acting through the Prime Minister's Office, improperly interfered in an RCMp security
operation."
The Prime Minister's Office appears equally culpable, though the
RCMP emerges looking slightly better with respect to a second clearly
proved attempt at improper political interference with policing. Again, the
political operative most clearly involved was Jean Carle. Jean Pelletier, the
Prime Minister's Chief of Staff was also directly involved in questionable
goings-on on this occasion. The Prime Minister, for his part, refused an
invitation to testify about his personal involvement."
The issue this time related to the security perimeter that police
routinely erect around such events. At one particular site Carle, acting in
his official capacity, insisted on moving security fences considerably further
back from a planned motorcade route than the RCMP considered necessary
for security purposes. The result was to create a distant, postage-stamp
sized demonstration area which provided "no real opportunity for the
protesters to engage in meaningful protest."32 Professor Pavlich, then the
University of British Columbia's Associate Vice President, Legal Affairs,
told the inquiry that the result was, "There were some people protesting,
but I sure as hell don't think anybody on that cavalcade would have been
able to see it."33
Although there was some attempt to cloak the interventions of the
Prime Minister's Office in the guise of "security" concerns or merely as
Ibid. at 96.
29 Ibid. at 98.
301bid. at 101.
31Pue, "Executive Accountability," supra note 5.
32,"Hughes Report," supra note 2 at 72.
3bid.
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expressions of opinion that stopped short of an attempt to directing the
police,' Commissioner Hughes found to the contrary on both counts.
Mister Carle had "inexcusably thrown his weight around."'5 He was
found to have offered "spurious" excuses"' and elsewhere his testimony,
contradicted by highly credible witnesses, is disbelieved.3 Carle is said to
have been "dishonest," to have conducted himself in art "unworthy" fashion
that "surely was a betrayal of the confidence placed in him" within the
Prime Minister's organization?' His performance at one key meeting was
found to be "nothing but a ruse.""' This is strong language, indeed. Coming
from a jurist as cautious and distinguished as Commissioner Hughes, it is
an unprecedented indictment of the integrity and honour of a key member
of a Canadian prime minister's staff.
Carle's actions "were motivated by a drive to shield the 18 leaders
from the sights and sounds of peaceful protest ... ."' Such motivations are
neither proper nor lawful. On the basis of the evidence before him,
Commissioner Hughes found conclusively "that Mr. Carle demanded that
the size of the 'demonstration area' be reduced in order to accomplish his
own agenda and I reject his explanation that the reduction was necessary
to ensure the safety of the protesters."'" Showing considerable fortitude and
integrity, both RCMP Superintendent Thompsett and Chris Brown, Director
of International Relations at the University of British Columbia, simply did
3 4 
Ibi at 64.
3 5 Ibd. at 66.
36 Ibid.
3 7 Ibi at 69.
38 m4i at 70.
39 Ibid. at 7.
401bd. at 75. This conclusion, damning though at is, asdsppomtng to many complanantsho
believed they had strong evidence indicating the morn ation behind all thist, as not just a desire to create
a retreat, but rather acting in fulfillment of specific undertakings giten to then-lndone-_an dictator
Suharto. Commissioner Hughes declines this conclusion (n the basis of the evidence before him in
something akin to the Scotts verdict of "not proven", ibhd. at 77:"Icannot conclude that these and other
documents prove that the Prime Minister's Office x;ent to earaordinary lengths to auage lndoneian
concerns that President Suharto be shielded from all signs of protest at the APFn conference." Gitcn
evidentiary and jurisdictional constraints on the crc RmP this falls short of the eculpatory finding the
Prime Minister's Office no doubt wishes to "spin" out of the report. See intericv. -ith I WNhitehall.
Q.C., The National, 7 August 2001, online: CBC <htt(p:itv.cbexa~national ran.YlT010St7html> (date
accessed: 14 September 2001) [hereinafter The Natwnal],
4 1
"Hughes Report," vupra note 2 at 150.
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not give effect to Carle's improper orders: his demands were not entirely
met.
Despite this quiet resistance, Commissioner Hughes found the
security perimeter had in fact been moved in a fashion that was
"inconsistent with respect for the Charter because it limited the protesters'
rights for reasons unrelated to security or to the need to allow for the
successful conduct of the meeting and may have increased the security
risk." In short, the "security" perimeter had become a "political" perimeter.
Nonetheless, the fence moved a good deal less than Carle had wanted.
Because of Superintendent Thompsett's actions, Hughes concluded that
"the interference with the protesters' rights was negligible and the maxim
de minimis non curat lex applies-the law does not concern itself with trivial
matters."42
In this case, then, the RCMP comes off reasonably well, but only
because one officer-Superintendent Thompsett-refused to give full
effect to improper directions. The Prime Minister's Office, however, was
quite conclusively and unambiguously found "guilty" of persistently and
aggressively seeking to improperly direct the police for colourable reasons.
Two important principles bear noting in this respect. First, despite
his high position in the Prime Minister's Office, Jean Carle had no inherent
authority and no right to act outside of the law. Patrick Monahan has
explained the principle of lawful state action clearly and succinctly as
follows: "All state power must be exercised according to law. No state
official has any inherent powers under Canadian law. Therefore, if state
officials wish to interfere with an individual's rights, they must be able to
point to some valid legal authority for the proposed action."43
This principle applies not only to the Prime Minister's Director of
Operations but also to his Chief of Staff and, of course, to the Prime
Minister himself.
We are presently left in an awkward situation. Mister Carle,
purporting to act on behalf of the Prime Minister, has been twice found to
have improperly interfered with the police to the detriment of law abiding
Canadian citizens. To this point the Prime Minister has neither admitted
to having endorsed Mr. Carle's actions nor (the only other alternative)
rebuked him for misuse of his position in the Prime Minister's Office. This
is an unacceptable constitutional outcome. In our system of government
42 Ibd. at 151.
43P.J. Monahan, Essentials of Canadian Constitutional Law (Concord, Ont.: Irwin Law, 1997) at
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ministerial responsibility means two things. One of Canada's leading
constitutional experts, Dean Peter Hogg of Osgoode Hall Law School, has
explained the concept in this way:
All the acts of the department are done in the name of the Mimiter, and it is the Minier
vwho isresponsible to Parliament for those acts. In thiscontet, the v.ord rcTtnsiblc' t often
said to entail two consequences. First, the Minister is supp i.scd to ewplam to Parliament,
when asked, the actions of his or her department. Secondly, the Minister is suprassed to
resign if a serious case of maladministration occurs vathin the department"
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Although the principle of responsible government-the keystone
of the Canadian constitution-requires the Prime Minister to accept
responsibility in a case such as this,45 Mr. Chrtien has not wished to
respond to the Hughes Report's central findings. The APEC affair moves
now from the realm of la,, and an inquiry process into "politics."'" Here is
what one lav ,yer who appeared for the complainants said on the release of
the Hughes Report: "We don't Imow the full story. As to whether or not
Mr. Carle's actions vere motivated by instructions received from his boss,
Mr. Chrrtien. We may never kmow that and Mr. Chrtien, of course,
declined Mr. Hughes' invitation to appear at the hearing.4
The choice the Prime Minister faces is to either accept personal
responsibility for a fundamental and unprecedented constitutional
violation, or to try to distance himself from the matter by excoriating a key
aide who is also a close personal friend. These choices must be equally
unpalatable. The third choice is to ignore the issue hoping that it will go
away.
44 P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 4th ed, looseleaf jTcronto, Car,eII, 144 71 (as
updated) at 9.3(d).
4.; "Civil liberties group calls for prime ministerial accountabihka, for plitical interference at
APEC", 9 August 2001. <http:iAvww.bccla.orgfpresirelea es~dl "t~rcrerort html> (date acceied: 14
September 2001). See also J.S. Russell "It's time for Chretien to come clean abaut IPE:," i'anc t:cr
Sun, 13 August 2001; A.D. Irvine, "PM should Apologize to Protesters" Tc&7ntoStar, 15 August 20i1,
46 Both the New Democratic Party and the Canadian Alliance indicated an early commitment to
pursuing the matter. Alea McDonough, the federal NDP leader, told CBC's V ateratonalon 7August
2001,that "The findings are very clear, that there v'as political interference at the highest le=el and an
accounting of that must be fully gisen:' Monte Solberg, then an Alliance MP obicrcd that "The
government's obviously been meddling in something they shouldn't be tsanled m" vhe bath Jim
Abbott, also an Alliance MP and Sv'end Robinson, a NDP MP indicated their determination to, ze the
matter properly addressed in Parliament. See The Naticnal, supra note 49.
47 Interview with C. Ward. The National. supra note 49
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It is unclear at the time of writing whether this matter will be
addressed in the autumn 2001 session of Parliament. The House of
Commons began that session confronting the aftermath of the 11
September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States and the government
enjoys a parliament in which it faces a divided and ineffectual opposition.
Needless to say (though it speaks poorly of them), members of the ruling
party have no desire to ask embarrassing questions of their leader, even
where fundamental matters of constitutional government are at stake.
Judging by first reactions, the Government of Canada seems
determined to employ five strategies to avoid confronting the matter
square-on. The following lines of argument were developed by a
government lawyer interviewed by Peter Mansbridge on CBC's The National
immediately following the release of the Hughes report:48
(1) a "dumb cop" defence-blaming the RCMP for all and any
wrongdoings;49
(2) emphasizing portions of the report that appear to endorse the
propriety of government actions;
50
48 See interview with I. Whitehall, The National, supra note 40.
49 See, for example, ibid.: "Well, I think what may be most damaging is that there findings
regarding the RCMP'S planning of the event. Mr. Hughes has been critical of that. I think that's one of
the major findings of the commission. And no doubt that will have to be examined by the RCMP and
lessons will be addressed." Elsewhere in the same interview Mr. Whitehall remarks:
Well, that is the finding of the commissioner. But then you have to remember that early on, the
commissioner asks two questions. He hypothesizes, as the complainants have, that there could be
two reasons for the actions of the RCMP. One was in order to accommodate the wishes of the
government of Canada in order to accommodate Mr. Suharto or alternatively systemic errors
made during the planning of the event. He rejects the first explanation and even examines the
systemic problems. And those, those conclusions will have to be examined by the RCM. and see
whether or not, in their view, given their technical knowledge of the issue in question, what
response they will have. I will remind you that this is an interim report.
Variations on the "it was all the RcMP's mistakes" occurred twice more during the course of the
interview.
50 Whitehall, ibid., "... we spent I dare say well over 100 days dealing with allegations that the
Government of Canada somehow or other pressured the RCMP to suppress freedom of expression in
order to accommodate a foreign dictator, Mr. Suharto. That was the central theme of that government
inquiry, as I see, for many, many, many, many, many days. And what I found comforting that Mr.
Hughes came to a totally unequivocal conclusion that there's no suggestion that that in fact happened
and he completely exonerated the Government of Canada." The central "theme" of the inquiry was in
fact the allegation that the Government of Canada, acting through the Prime Minister's Office, had
sought to improperly influence the police for illegitimate purposes (which was found to have happened).
The arguments concerning Suharto suggested one possible reason for this but no more. The "complete"
exoneration of the Government of Canada, if indeed such is to be found in this carefully drafted report,
is limited only to very specific circumstances. There is, simply, no blanket endorsement of the
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(3) attempting to diminish the findings of Commissioner Hughes
(it's only an "interim" report after all);'
(4) a sort of "dumb Commissioner' defence - refusing, simply, to
accept any findings that reflect poorly on the Prime Minister's
Office;'2
(5) a "we told you so" argument that emphasizes the violence of
subsequent anti-globalization demonstrations in order to argue
that whatever happened in Vancouver in 1997 must have been
justified. 3
Assuming that this outline response represents the position of the
Government of Canada-and there has been no other developed response
by the Government-it reveals a disturbing attempt to dodge responsibility
for matters of fundamental constitutional importance. None of the points
withstands critical scrutiny.
Violence at subsequent demonstrations (point #5) is, simply,
entirely, irrelevant to an assessment of the matters of government
wrongdoing found to have taken place in 1997. The fact that the RCMPI may
have "goofed" (point #1) or that the government or police may-in some
particulars-have acted properly (#2) are simply irrelevant.
The germane questions that have not been addressed relate to the
role of the Prime linister's Office and the Prime Minister's responsibility
for the improper conduct of his senior staff. The question of the Prime
Minister's personal role in this remains entirely unexplained, unaccounted
for, and uninvestigated. It is, not to put too fine a point on it, unbecoming
Government of Canada's actions to be found.
51 Note the reminder to this effect, quoted in the preceding foetnote.
Ibid. Refusing to accept the of the only judicial inquiry to mos'tigate this matter is a bild,
perhaps desperate, stategy, revealed in the tollowing exchange:
MANSBRIDGE: Okay. Well let's look at a couple of these things in particular, if I can bring up
some of the remarks that Justice Hughes used in his report and veli get sour reaction to them
Thisis on the removal of the tenters. 'The federal gowrment had no authotV to make decismns
which may have compromised an RcIP security opcration particulary, gn en that such decrtsons
were unjustifiably inconsistent vith the charter. The federal go" ernment, acting through the Prime
Minister's office, improperly interfered in an RcM p sccurityoperation.' Do ou accept that!
VHITEHALL: No, I do not. And I do so vith regret. The fact of the matter is that the ctdence
shows that government officials had a concern about %andalism at that site. That %,as priar to the
site becoming a secure site.
Ibid.: WHITEHALL Of course, since this c% cnt. .e ha% e had much more significant vwlence
and problems at major international events. So to that extent, the rules ha% e unfolded. But ne% erthelQTQS,
this is the first attempt to examine a major security eent,'
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of the highest office in the land, having been found acting improperly by the
only formal inquiry charged with investigating these matters, to simply
announce that it "rejects" the findings (#4). That is a prescription for
prime ministerial lawlessness. The findings are there, made by a
distinguished, cautious, jurist. They are carefully grounded in the evidence.
They are documented at length in Commissioner Hughes' formal report.
Finally, however it does have to be acknowledged that, in the
language of the RCMP Act, Commissioner Hughes' report is called an
"interim" report (#3). However, his report is the final word on the only
portion of the procedures of the cPc that involves a judicial process. In the
workings of this statute, the "interim" report is the only document to
emerge from an authoritative, impartial fact-finding process. The rest is left
to a formal response by the RCMP Commissioner (an Order-in-Council
appointee),54 the Solicitor General (a member of the Prime Minister's
Cabinet) and the administrative head of the cPc (an Order-in-Council
appointee). The "final" report is not the product of a judicial process and
will not be written by anyone who has heard and sifted through all the
evidence first-hand.
The arguments deployed so far to deflect attention from the Prime
Minister's Office are "spin," nothing more. They are part of a political
process and do not pass muster as legal argument. The question of further
response lies in the realm of "politics." It is fitting, then, to conclude with
the words of two politicians, one on the left and one on the right of the
Canadian political spectrum.
Starting from the left, Svend Robinson, New Democratic Party
Member of Parliament, assessed the post-Hughes Report situation in this
way:
The fact of the matter is that even within the narrow confines of this report, and ... it was a
very narrow scope for the commission. Even within that, let's be very clear about what Justice
Hughes found. What he found is that the prime minister's right hand man, Jean Carle, on
two occasions was acting basically as a political thug and getting directions, clear political
54 On 7 September 2001, RCMP Commissioner Giuliano Zaccardelli held a press conference in
which he accepted blame on behalf of the RCMP for things that went wrong at the APEC conference. See:
Hugh Windsor, "When Mountie Zack muffed a golden opportunity" 10 September 2001, page A 13; Jim
Bronskill, "RCMP erred at APEC, boss admits - Commissioner denies force aims to criminalize dissent"
The Ottawa Citizen 8 September 2001. The Commissioner showed some embarrassment on the issue
of political interference with the RCMP during this press conference but, by and large, repeated the line
developed earlier by Government Lawyer Ivan Whitehall - police "goofs," not political interference,
needs to be fixed. For the RCMP response, including the Commissioner'swritten response to the Hughes
Report: online: RCMP <http:/www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/news/nr-01-19.htm> (date accessed: 19 September
2001).
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directions to the RCMP. He also found the superintendent May v-ho vas in charge of sacunty
for the APEC summit believed that the prime minister %%as directly inoled in giving
directions for security operations. So I think that v.hat this does effectr ely is to rats- some
very serious questions once again about the role of the prime minister. For four yearN- he
stone-walled. He said let the commission do its v.ork. He's refus-d to appe-ar, even though
Hughes basically said look, you should appar if this commission report tsgoing to hae an)
integrity.'-
From the other end of the political spectrum, Jim Abbott, Canadian
Alliance Party Member of Parliament, made these observations:
The solicitor general hassaid that he isgoing to comment on the final report. The mird final
is not a benign vord. It's a very active %word. He's talking about the fact that this report no-,.
goes to the RcMP Commisjionerxvvhowill then take it apart in hisc.n time. He vvtll then sand
that report to Shirley Heafey. Shirley Heafey, the head of the Pubh Complaints
Commission, the same person that interfered %'ath this so badly at the start of the AFEC
inquiry that the three original commissioners ended up leaing the inquiry in disgust until
Ted Hughes came along. She will then v.nte a report. Oh. she a os v,as appointed by the
prime minister, I recall. Then that report is going to go to the sohcitor general v-ho is then
going to read it. When? And in the meantime, vve hate Kananaskisvath the G3 coming up
in 11 months. This report has to go to the House of Commons. We have to dealvath it at the
House of Commons. We have to see that this prime minister or any succecsve prime mintster
cannot get involved ... in the way that Jean Chretten did."
In short, substantial and important matters need to be addressed.
There is, however, no process available to deal with a constitutional matter
of this importance that is independent of political control. It is equally
unlikely, then, that steps ,ill be taken either to remedy the particular
wrongdoings or to amend the RCMPAct so as to fix the relationship between
politicians and police in Canada.
These are disturbing conclusions. I hope they are proved wrong.
55 Interiev~ed by The 'auowl. supra note 4U.
Ibid.

